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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
LAMALFA V. HEARN: "DISCLOSURE" UNDER MARYLAND
RULE 5-703(b) MEANS EVIDENCE MAY BE ADMISSIBLE,
UNDER A TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION, SO LONG AS THE
EVIDENCE SATISFIES THE FOUR ELEMENTS OF THE
RULE AND THE EVIDENCE IS USED TO EXPLAIN THE
FACTUAL BASIS OF AN EXPERT'S OPINION.
By: W. Ryan Parry
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that disclosure meant admission
under Maryland Rule 5-703(b), giving the trial court discretion to admit
medical records. Lamalfa v. Hearn, 457 Md. 350, 178 A.3d 501 (2018).
Once admitted, the jury may use the evidence to assess the factual basis of an
expert's opinion. Id. at 356, 178 A.3d at 504. Therefore, the jury may use
the medical records to evaluate the testimony if the data is deemed
trustworthy, unprivileged, reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming an
opinion, and necessary to illuminate the expert's testimony. Id.
On October 14, 2011, Patricia Lamalfa ("Lamalfa") was riding in the
back seat of an SUV when the vehicle was rear-ended by Janis Heam
("Hearn"). Lamalfa did not immediately seek medical treatment for the
accident until the following morning. She complained of lower back pain
and tenderness in her left forearm, but was released from Mercy Medical
Center ("Mercy"). A week after the accident, Lamalfa sought treatment after
experiencing further pain in her left hip, right shoulder, and tailbone.
In November 2011, Lamalfa underwent an MRI revealing an injury that
would later be diagnosed as a torn rotator cuff requiring surgery. Several
months following the accident, Lamalfa began experiencing abdominal pain
and she was diagnosed with an epigastric hernia, a medical condition she was
previously diagnosed with in 1984. As a result of her injuries, Lamalfa filed
a negligence action against Hearn in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
seeking more than $75,000 in damages.
During trial, both parties called doctors as expert witnesses. Hearn's
expert, Dr. Halikman, stated that he relied upon four of Lamalfa's medical
records in forming his opinion. When Hearn's counsel moved to admit the
medical records, Lamalfa objected, arguing that the medical reports were
hearsay. Ultimately, the court overruled Lamalfa's objection and admitted
all four records into evidence without a limiting instruction. Dr. Halikman
opined that, based upon his review of the medical records, there was a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Lamalfa did not sustain the
rotator cuff injury or the epigastric hernia as a result of the accident.
At the conclusion of trial, the court granted Lamalfa's motion for
judgment, finding Hearn negligent. The case was then sent to the jury for a
determination on the amount of damages. The jury returned a verdict
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awarding Lamalfa the full amount of her medical expenses totaling
$9,926.05 and $650 in non-economic damages.
Lamalfa timely appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals,
contending that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the four
medical records relied on by Dr. Halikman. The court affirmed the trial
court's ruling, holding that there was no significant difference between
disclosure and admission under Maryland Rule 5-703 ("Md. Rule 5-703").
Therefore, the jurors were permitted to use the medical records, and
Lamalfa's failure to request a limiting instruction was a waiver of the issue
on appeal. Lamalfa proceeded by filing a petition for writ of certiorari. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to determine whether under
Md. Rule 5-703, disclosed meant admitted and whether the admittance of the
four medical records into evidence was proper.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by examining the
plain language of Md. Rule 5-703. Lamalfa, 457 Md. at 381, 178 A.3d at
519. Md. Rule 5-703 (a) permits an expert to form an opinion based on data
regardless of whether such data would be admissible into evidence. Id.
Subsection (b) of the rule further states that such data must satisfy four
elements before the trial court may disclose the data to the jury. Id. The
elements require the data to be deemed trustworthy, unprivileged, necessary
to illuminate the expert's testimony, and reasonably relied upon by the
expert. Id. However, the opposing party must request a limiting instruction
that the data only be used in evaluating the validity of the expert's opinion
and not for its substantive value. Id.
While Md. Rule 5-703 does not define the term disclosed, the court
reasoned that if disclosure were to be permitted narrowly, it would have been
specified in the rule. Lamalfa, 457 Md. at 382, 178 A.3d at 520. Looking at
precedent, the court reasoned that Maryland courts have consistently
interpreted disclosure to mean admission if the data satisfies the four
elements of the rule. Id. at 382-83, 178 A.3d at 520 (citing Brown v. Daniel
Realty Co., 409 Md. 565, 601, 976 A.2d 300, 321 (2009)). These courts
admitted the data into evidence and did not simply disclose them briefly to
the jury, as Lamalfa contended. Lamalfa, 457 Md. at 382, 178 A.3d at 520.
The court next addressed Lamalfa's contention that requesting a limiting
instruction was futile once the jury received the medical records. Lamalfa,
457 Md. at 386, 178 A.3d at 522. Md. Rule 5-703 expressly states that upon
request, the trial judge must give a limiting instruction for the jury to use the
data relied upon by the expert in assessing the validity and probative value of
the opinion, and not as substantive evidence. Id. The court further reasoned
that limiting instructions explain to a jury how evidence is to be used, and
that a jury is presumed to follow the instruction. Id. at 387, 178 A.3d at 523.
Therefore, the court determined that since Lamalfa failed to make a motion
for a limiting instruction, she waived any issue as to the weight that the jury
may have given the medical records. Id. at 388, 178 A.3d at 523.
Using this reasoning, the court examined whether the four medical
records relied upon by Hearn's expert witness, Dr. Halikman, satisfied the
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four elements of Md. Rule 5-703. Lamalfa, 457 Md. at 388-89, 178 A.3d at
523-24. Md. Rule 5-703 does not require a trial court to announce that the
elements were satisfied on the record. Id. Therefore, the trial court's failure
to mention all the elements did not preclude the conclusion that the elements
for disclosure had been met. Id. The court then acknowledged that Lamalfa
did not dispute that the records were unprivileged or reasonably relied on by
Dr. Halikman. Id. at 391, 178 A.3d at 525. Further they found that the
records were trustworthy since they were created by appropriate medical
professionals. Id. Lastly, due to the time period of the plaintiffs injuries,
the records were found to be necessary to illuminate Dr. Halikman's opinion.
Id. at 392, 178 A.3d at 525-26. Thus, the records satisfied the required
elements of Md. Rule 5-703 (b) and the trial court was correct in admitting
the records. Id.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that disclosed meant admitted
under Md. Rule 5-703 if the evidence satisfies the four elements set forth in
the rule. Therefore, such evidence may, at a trial court's discretion, be
disclosed to the jury to explain the factual basis of an expert's testimony.
This ruling strengthens a party's ability to have the jury view documentation
they otherwise may not be able to access. This holding further emphasizes
the importance of requesting a limiting instruction when challenging a trial
judge's ruling to preserve it for appeal. Furthermore, the court's holding will
require attorneys to take a more calculated approach when determining what
records their expert witnesses will be relying on to form an opinion.
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